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OPINION OF THE COURT  
             
 
 
SAROKIN, Circuit Judge: 
 
 Plaintiff H.K. Porter Company, Inc. ("Porter") filed suit in 
federal district court against the Pennsylvania Insurance 
Guaranty Association ("PIGA") seeking a declaration that PIGA was 
legally obligated to indemnify Porter under the terms of three 
insurance policies issued to Porter by an insolvent insurance 
company.  Porter claimed that each of the approximately 100,000 
lawsuits filed against it constitutes a separate "covered claim" 
for which Porter is entitled to the statutory limit of $300,000 
on each claim, subject to the $5 million coverage limit of each 
policy.  The district court entered an order for partial summary 
judgment in favor of PIGA, holding that Porter was only entitled 
to indemnity for three covered claims -- one for each policy that 
Porter held with the insolvent insurance company -- on the theory 
that Porter, rather than those claiming against it, was the 
claimant.  We disagree and reverse. 
 
I. 
 Beginning in 1958, H.K. Porter was engaged in the 
manufacture and sale of various types of asbestos-containing 
products.  These products were sold for use in shipyards and the 
ship-building industry across the country and around the world.   
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 In 1984, Porter began to be inundated with lawsuits by 
individuals alleging bodily injury or death as a result of 
exposure to asbestos-containing products.  By 1991 Porter was 
being sued at the rate of approximately 2,000 separate cases per 
month.  The sheer volume of these lawsuits eventually forced 
Porter into Chapter 11 bankruptcy, by which time there had been 
approximately 100,000 lawsuits filed against Porter.  Porter 
settled or disposed of many of these claims through payment of 
$30 million of its own funds.  At the time of the bankruptcy, the 
estimated value of identified pending lawsuits against Porter was 
approximately $590 million.    
 During its operational years, Porter had maintained several 
different insurance policies, including three "commercial 
catastrophe liability" policies issued by Integrity Insurance 
Company.  These policies had indemnity limits of $5 million per 
occurrence/$5 million annual aggregate, resulting in a total 
aggregate of $15 million under the three policies.  All parties 
agree that the policies cover liability and indemnity for bodily 
injury arising from Porter's manufacture and sale of asbestos 
products. 
 When the flood of lawsuits began in the late 1980s, Porter 
sought indemnity from Integrity for all amounts which Porter had 
paid in the process of settling lawsuits or would become legally 
obligated to pay in the future.  In March of 1987, however, 
Integrity Insurance Company was declared insolvent.  Porter thus 
turned to PIGA for indemnity.  PIGA is an unincorporated 
association created by statute for the purpose of providing means 
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for payment of covered claims when the insurance company 
responsible for those claims has become insolvent, and for the 
purpose of avoiding financial loss to claimants and policy 
holders.  See 40 P.S. § 1701.102(1) (repealed 1994).1 
   PIGA persistently refused to indemnify, defend, or in any 
way become involved in Porter's asbestos lawsuits, despite 
Porter's continual requests starting in 1987.  As a result, 
Porter filed suit against PIGA on February 12, 1993, seeking a 
declaration that PIGA could be required to pay Porter up to $15 
million -- the $5 million aggregate limit for each of the three 
Integrity policies -- as well as counsel fees and expenses for 
the defense of the lawsuits.2 
 The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment.  One 
of the issues presented in the motions was whether the $299,900 
statutory limit3 set forth in section 201 of the PIGA Act for 
each "covered claim" applied to three claims (one claim 
supposedly made by Porter under each Integrity policy), or 
                                                           
1The PIGA Act was repealed on December 12, 1994, see 1994, Dec. 
12, P.L. 1005, No. 137, § 2, and replaced by the Pennsylvania 
Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association Act, 40 P.S. 
§ 991.1801 et seq.  The PIGA Act, however, applies in the instant 
matter. 
2Porter has already paid approximately $30 million to defend and 
settle lawsuits thus far, $18 million of which was for the cost 
of defense, and the remaining $12 million for the actual 
disposition and settlement of the claims. See H.K. Porter 
Company, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Insurance Guaranty Association, No. 
93-212, typescript at 2 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 1995); Appellant's 
Brief at 2. The issue of whether PIGA must indemnify Porter for 
the $18 million dollars it paid for the defense of lawsuits is 
before the district court and not at issue in this interlocutory 
appeal.  
3The statutory limit is actually $300,000, subject to a $100 
deductible.  See 40 P.S. § 1701.201(b)(1)(i). 
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whether it applied to each separate, individual claimant lawsuit 
submitted by Porter to PIGA.  This section provides, in relevant 
part, as follows: 
(1)  The association shall: 
 
(i)  Be obligated to make payments to the extent of the 
covered claims of an insolvent insurer existing prior 
to the determination of said insurer's insolvency, and 
covered claims arising within thirty days after the 
determination of the insolvency, or before the policy 
expiration date if less than thirty days after such 
determination . . . but such obligation shall include 
only that amount of each covered claim which is in 
excess of one hundred dollars ($100), and is less than 
three hundred thousand dollars ($300,000).  In no event 
shall the association be obligated on a covered claim 
in an amount in excess of the obligation of the 
insolvent insurer under the policy under which the 
claim arises. 
 
40 P.S. § 1701.201(b)(1)(i).    
 The district court held that the $299,900 statutory limit 
applied to each of the three claims it determined Porter had made 
(one under each of the Integrity policies), for a total maximum 
recovery of $899,700, far below Porter's $15 million indemnity 
claim against Integrity.  H.K. Porter Company, Inc. v. 
Pennsylvania Insurance Guaranty Association, No. 93-212, 
typescript at 11-12 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 1995). 
 Porter filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the district 
court denied the motion.  Porter then filed a motion requesting 
that the district court amend its Order regarding the statutory 
limit to acknowledge the existence of a controlling question of 
law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of 
opinion, which was granted.  Subsequently, Porter filed a 
Petition for Permission to Appeal from an Interlocutory Order, 
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pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).  This court granted Porter's 
Petition, and we now decide this appeal. 
 
II. 
 The district court had jurisdiction over the instant action 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b), which provides federal district courts 
with original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases under 
Title 11 of the United States Code.  This court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).  Our review of a grant or denial 
of summary judgment by the district court is plenary.  See Rappa 
v. New Castle County, 18 F.3d 1043, 1050 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
III. 
 In November of 1970, Pennsylvania adopted the Pennsylvania 
Insurance Guaranty Association Act in order to provide insurance 
policy holders with a means to receive payment of claims covered 
against insolvent insurance companies.  40 P.S. § 1701.102(1). 
The Act and the statutory creation of PIGA were based on a model 
bill created by the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners in response to the social harm that results from 
insurance companies becoming insolvent.  See Sands v. 
Pennsylvania Insurance Guaranty Ass'n, 423 A.2d 1224, 1225-26 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1980).   
 One of the stated purposes of Pennsylvania's Act is: 
(1) To provide a means for the payment of covered 
claims under certain property and casualty insurance 
policies, to avoid excessive delay in payment of such 
claims, and to avoid financial loss to claimants or 
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policyholders as a result of the insolvency of an 
insurer. 
40 P.S. § 1701.102(1).   
 Under section 201 of the Act, PIGA is obligated to make 
payments for each "covered claim" against the insolvent insurance 
company, subject to a $299,900 statutory limit per "covered 
claim."  40 P.S. § 1701.201(b)(1)(i).  In no instance is PIGA 
obligated to pay a covered claim in excess of the maximum amount 
the insolvent insurance company would have paid under the terms 
of the policy.  Id.  
 The resolution of this case rests on the determination of 
what, exactly, constitutes a "covered claim."  The Act defines it 
as follows: 
"Covered claim" means an unpaid claim, including a 
claim for unearned premiums, which arises under a 
property and casualty insurance policy of an insolvent 
insurer and is: 
 
(i)  The claim of a person who at the time of the 
insured event resulting in loss or liability was a 
resident of this Commonwealth, or 
 
(ii)  A claim arising from an insured event 
resulting in loss or liability to property which 
was permanently situated in this Commonwealth. 
40 P.S. § 1701.103(5)(a).   
 The district court concluded that the "covered claims" for 
which Porter was entitled to indemnity from PIGA included only 
one claim under each Integrity policy, for a total of three 
claims.  H.K. Porter v. PIGA, No. 93-212, typescript at 11-12. 
The district court's rationale focused upon the word "person" in 
the phrase of the statutory definition of "covered claim" which 
reads:  "'Covered claim' means . . . [t]he claim of a person who 
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at the time of the insured event resulting in loss or liability 
was a resident of this Commonwealth."  40 P.S. §1701.103(5)(a)(i) 
(emphasis added).  The district court noted that under the 
statute "person" is defined as "an individual, a corporation, a 
partnership, an association, or any other holder of or claimant 
under a property and casualty insurance policy." H.K. Porter v. 
PIGA, No. 93-212, typescript at 11 (citing 40 P.S. § 
1703.103(8)).  The court thus concluded that by "[a]pplying that 
language to the claims of Porter, it is clear that the claims at 
issue are the claims of a person (Porter) for indemnification 
under the three Integrity policies,"  H.K. Porter v. PIGA, No. 
93-212, typescript at 11, and therefore Porter is limited to 
indemnification for only $899,700, or $299,900 for each of the 
three Integrity policies.   
 Upon Porter's Motion for Reconsideration of this 
determination, the Court succinctly clarified its position as 
follows: 
This Court is aware that "person" is defined by statute 
as, among other things, a holder of or claimant under a 
property and casualty insurance policy.  However, that 
is not the issue.  The issue is who is the "person" 
making the claim in this case.  Clearly, the "person" 
making the claim in this case is Porter. . . .  
 
*     *     * 
 
[T]he clear language of the PIGA Act dictates that the 
covered claim is the claim of Porter for 
indemnification.  We find no support in either the 
statute or the case law of this jurisdiction for 
Porter's assertion that its claims somehow encompass 
the claims of the underlying asbestos claimants.  We 
believe that the reading of such a concept into the 
statute would violate the clear and express language of 
the Act. 
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H.K. Porter v. PIGA, No. 93-212, typescript at 4-5 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 
9, 1995).    
 Porter submits that the "salient question is not whether 
Porter has 'covered claims' within the meaning of the PIGA Act, 
but how many covered claims Porter is able to assert." 
Appellant's Brief at 18 (emphasis in original).  We agree.   
 The district court's analysis appears to rest on the faulty 
premise that if the insured submits numerous claims of others, 
such claims are to be treated as one covered claim per policy. 
Such a position, however, is untenable.  As clearly illustrated 
by an analogy presented to the district court by Porter, there 
are circumstances in which one person is entitled to receive 
indemnity for more than one covered claim per policy:  
Let's suppose, Your Honor, that you, yourself, are 
insured with Acme Automobile Insurance Company and 
that, unfortunately, in one month you have two separate 
accidents, each magically causing a $300,000 damage to 
each victim in each accident.  Two lawsuits arrive at 
your house on the same day.  You tender them to your 
insurance company.  But on the same day your insurance 
company goes insolvent.  So you tender them to PIGA.   
 
*     *     *      
 
Now, let's suppose that . . . PIGA does not step up to 
the plate to defend Your Honor and to indemnify Your 
Honor. . . . Your Honor then is left at the plate. Your 
Honor will have to reach into your pockets to pay each 
$300,000 claim.  Now Your Honor is out $600,000 and 
Your Honor files a lawsuit against PIGA.  Under Your 
Honor's construction of the statute, you would only be 
entitled to $300,000.  But aren't the two claims that 
Your Honor has presented to PIGA separate covered 
claims?  If they are separate covered claims and if 
PIGA has to pay out $300,000 on each claim, it doesn't 
make sense to reward PIGA for refusing to pay each of 
those claims, wait for PIGA to be sued, and then for 
PIGA to assert in the lawsuit that Your Honor brought, 
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ah ha, there is only one covered claim here because 
Your Honor is the "person" who's making the claim. 
Appendix at 145-46.  Unlike the district court, we find this 
analogy instructive and persuasive.    
 Accordingly, we reject the district court's conclusion that 
the PIGA Act only allows insureds to receive indemnity for one 
covered claim per policy.  Rather, we conclude that the PIGA Act 
must be read to provide insureds with indemnity for each claim 
raised by underlying claimants.  Each "covered claim" to which 
the $299,900 statutory cap applies is appropriately read to 
encompass the claims of the underlying tort victims, i.e. the 
underlying claimants.  There are four bases upon which we reach 
our conclusion. 
 First, contrary to the district court's conclusion, the 
plain language of the PIGA Act militates that the "covered 
claims" to which the statutory cap applies include the claims of 
underlying claimants.  Under the PIGA Act, a "covered claim" is 
"[t]he claim of a person who at the time of the insured event 
resulting in loss or liability was a resident" of Pennsylvania. 
40 P.S. § 1701.103(5)(a)(i) (emphasis added).4  A "person" is 
defined as "an individual, a corporation, a partnership, an 
association, or any other holder of or claimant under a property 
and casualty policy."  40 P.S. § 1701.103(8) (emphasis added). 
Therefore in Pennsylvania a "covered claim" for which PIGA must 
pay up to $300,000 is: 
                                                           
4There is an additional debate as to whether PIGA must pay the 
underlying claims of asbestos victims who are not residents of 
Pennsylvania.  That issue is not before us on this appeal and we 
do not address it here. 
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The claim of a [holder of or claimant under a property 
and casualty insurance policy] who at the time of the 
insured event resulting in loss or liability was a 
resident of [Pennsylvania]. 
40 P.S. § 1701.103(5)(a)(i) (emphasis added).  
 Second, as stated above, the intent of the Pennsylvania 
legislature in passing the PIGA Act was to "provide a means for 
payment of covered claims . . . , to avoid excessive delays in 
payment of such claims, and to avoid financial loss to 
policyholders as a result of the insolvency of an insurer."  40 
P.S. § 1701.102(1).  While we recognize that the Pennsylvania 
legislature did not intend for all insureds in all cases to be 
placed in the same position they would have been if their insurer 
had not become insolvent, see Blackwell v. Pennsylvania Insurance 
Guaranty Ass'n, 567 A.2d 1103, 1106 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), the 
result that the district court's decision would bring, whereby 
Porter could only recover $899,700 -- a mere 6% of the $15 
million Porter would have been able to obtain from Integrity --is 
inconsistent with the stated policy goals of the legislation. 
 Third, it is only logical that the covered claims for which 
Porter seeks indemnity be viewed as comprised of the individual 
claims of the underlying tort victims.  When multiple persons 
have been injured in an accident, each injured person has a 
separate covered claim even if their individual claims are 
asserted by the insured -- in this case Porter -- rather than the 
individuals themselves.  Indeed, under Pennsylvania's "direct 
action" statute, tort victims may sue an insurer directly if the 
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insured has gone bankrupt or become insolvent.5  Therefore, 
provided the relevant residency requirements are met, it makes 
logical sense that PIGA indemnify Porter for each claim of the 
injured tort victims, given that these tort victims could have 
instituted claims against Integrity themselves.  
 Finally, the district court's conclusion that PIGA need only 
indemnify Porter once for each of the three policies would have 
grave policy consequences if allowed to stand.  The district 
court's conclusion would encourage PIGA or a carrier insuring 
"covered claims" to limit its liability by wrongly refusing to 
honor the individual injury claims presented by the insured. When 
the insured filed suit to compel payment, the numerous claims of 
those injured suddenly would be converted into a single claim by 
the insured and be subject to the maximum limit.  As a result, 
                                                           
5This statute reads as follows: 
No policy of insurance against loss or damage resulting 
from accident to or injury suffered by an employee or 
other person and for which the person insured is liable 
. . . shall hereafter be issued or delivered in this 
State by any corporation, or other insurer, authorized 
to do business in this State, unless there shall be 
contained within such policy a provision that the 
insolvency or bankruptcy of the person insured shall 
not release the insurance carrier from payment of 
damages for injury sustained or loss occasioned during 
the life of such policy, and stating that in case 
execution against the insured is returned unsatisfied 
in an action brought by the injured person, or his or 
her personal representative in case death results from 
the accident, because of such insolvency or bankruptcy, 
then an action may be maintained by the injured person, 
or his or her personal representative, against such 
corporation, under the terms of the policy, for the 
amount of the judgment in the said action, not 
exceeding the amount of the policy.  
40 P.S. § 117. 
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insureds would receive virtually no coverage for their claims 
and, even if the victims were ultimately able to obtain coverage 
through the direct action statute, extensive delays and 
litigation would result.   
  Our conclusion that the "covered claims" at issue encompass 
the claims of the underlying tort victims finds further support 
from several cases which present a similar issue and which 
interpret insurance statutes from other states that, like 
Pennsylvania's Act, are based upon the model bill. 
A. 
 The case which most closely parallels this action is the 
Connecticut Supreme Court case, Connecticut Insurance Guaranty 
Association v. Union Carbide Corp., 585 A.2d 1216 (Conn. 1991). 
Union Carbide grew out of the 1984 chemical disaster in Bhopal, 
India, which resulted in the deaths of 2,300 people and injuries 
to more than 200,000 others.  Id. at 1219. Union Carbide brought 
a declaratory judgment action against the Connecticut Insurance 
Guaranty Association (CIGA) to resolve numerous issues relating 
to CIGA's obligation to reimburse Union Carbide for claims 
arising out of the disaster.  Union Carbide had reached a 
settlement agreement with the Indian government and had then 
approached its insurance companies for reimbursement.  The 
insurance companies had become insolvent, and Union Carbide thus 
approached CIGA for indemnity.  Id.   
 One of the primary claims raised in Union Carbide was 
whether a "covered claim" referred to the claim of each victim 
who filed an action against Union Carbide or whether Union 
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Carbide presented only one covered claim which was subject to the 
$300,000 limit.  Just as PIGA argues in the instant action, CIGA 
argued that the only covered claims were Union Carbide's six 
claims, each under one of six insurance policies issued by the 
insolvent insurers, limiting Union Carbide to a maximum recovery 
of $1,800,000.  Id. at 1220.   
 The Connecticut Supreme Court disagreed and held that CIGA 
was required to pay the claims presented up to the total limits 
of the underlying policies.   The Supreme Court based its 
conclusion on several grounds, each of which is equally 
applicable in the instant case. 
 First, the Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that, under 
the Connecticut statute, the Bhopal victims could sue Union 
Carbide's insolvent insurance companies directly under a 
Connecticut statute.  Id.  This direct action statute allows a 
tort victim to file an action directly against an insurer if the 
victim has obtained a judgment against an insured that remains 
unsatisfied for thirty days.  Id.; see also C.G.S.A. § 38-175. 
Thus, sheer logic dictated that CIGA be held liable for the 
claims of the individual tort victims.  As explained above, 
Pennsylvania also has a "direct action" statute allowing tort 
victims to sue an insurer directly if the insured has become 
bankrupt or insolvent.  40. P.S. § 117.  Therefore, the 
Connecticut Supreme Court's reasoning applies to the instant 
action.  
 Second, the Connecticut Supreme Court rejected CIGA's 
argument that the definition of "covered claim" only encompassed 
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the claim of the insured Union Carbide, rather than the claims of 
the underlying tort victims.  Union Carbide, 585 A.2d at 1221. 
The Court recognized that under the statute a "covered claim" 
encompasses the claims of "the claimant or insured." C.G.S.A. 
§38-275(4) (emphasis added).  The Court thus concluded that under 
this language either the insured resident of Connecticut or the 
underlying claimant, in that case the Bhopal victims, might 
present a "covered claim" to CIGA.  Id.   
 While the language in Pennsylvania's statute is not 
identical to that in Connecticut's statute,6 it, too, suggests 
the same conclusion.  As explained above, when the definition of 
"person" from 40 P.S. § 1701.103(8) is inserted in the definition 
of "covered claim" the resulting definition makes clear that the 
Connecticut Supreme Court's conclusion that a "covered claim" may 
be presented by either the insured or a claimant is equally true 
in Pennsylvania: 
 The claim of a [holder of or claimant under a property 
and casualty insurance policy] who at the time of the 
insured event resulting in loss or liability was a 
resident of [Pennsylvania]. 
                                                           
6We recognize that the definition of a "covered claim" in the 
Connecticut statute at issue in Union Carbide differs in some 
respects from the definition in the Pennsylvania statute at issue 
here.  For example, under the Connecticut statute, a claim 
against a Connecticut resident insured could qualify as "covered" 
even if asserted by a non-resident based on an event occurring 
outside of the state of Connecticut.  See Union Carbide, 585 A.2d 
at 1220. Under the Pennsylvania statute, by contrast, a claim can 
qualify as "covered" only if it is either "(i) The claim of a 
person who at the time of the insured event resulting in loss or 
liability was a resident of this Commonwealth, or (ii) A claim 
arising from an insured event resulting in loss or liability to 
property which was permanently situated in this Commonwealth."  
46 P.S. §1701.103(5)(a).  This difference, however, is not 
significant for present purposes. 
16 
  
40 P.S. § 1701.103(5)(a)(i) (emphasis added).            
 Third, the Connecticut Supreme Court ruled as it did because 
it concluded that such a ruling was consistent with the intent of 
the legislature: 
Apart from our conclusion that the text of the act does 
not support the imposition of a $300,000 limit upon 
[Union Carbide's] claim for indemnification under each 
of the six policies whose insurers have become 
insolvent, we are also persuaded that the remedial 
purpose of this legislation would be largely defeated 
by such a restriction.  Although this case involves a 
substantial indemnification claim of $32,500,000 
presented by a large corporate enterprise, it is not 
exceptional today for individuals to carry liability 
insurance with limits far in excess of $300,000.  The 
recovery of $300,000 by a single victim of an 
automobile accident is not extraordinary, and when 
there are multiple victims the total liability of the 
insured can readily exceed that amount.  If we were to 
accept CIGA's argument that only an insured may present 
a covered claim and that such a claim for 
indemnification from a single occurrence is limited to 
$300,000, the protection of Connecticut residents 
against losses resulting from insolvency of insurance 
carriers, which the legislature intended to provide, 
would often prove illusory.   
Union Carbide, 585 A.2d at 1222-23.  There can be no doubt that 
this same rationale applies in the context of Pennsylvania.  As 
mentioned above, Connecticut's Insurance Guaranty Act is based 
upon the same model bill as the Act in Pennsylvania, and the 
purpose of Pennsylvania's Act is to "provide a means for the 
payment of covered claims . . . and to avoid financial loss to 
claimants or policyholders as a result of the insolvency of an 
insurer."  40 P.S. § 1201.102(1).  
 A case recently decided by this court involving a similar 
issue suggests that the reasoning in Union Carbide may be 
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appropriately adopted by this court.  In T & N v. Pennsylvania 
Ins. Guaranty Ass'n, 44 F.3d 174 (3d Cir. 1994), we were 
presented with the question of whether an insured company who had 
entered into one settlement agreement for all underlying claims 
with its now-insolvent insurer and sought recovery from PIGA, 
presented one covered claim for recovery or multiple covered 
claims.  T & N argued that under the reasoning of Union Carbide 
it presented separate covered claims for each of the underlying 
claimants.  We considered Union Carbide and determined that the 
facts of Union Carbide were different from T & N's scenario:   
Union Carbide settled with the underlying claimants. 
The settlement agreement can thus be viewed as the 
embodiment of each claim which was filed against Union 
Carbide.  However, in the present case, T & N settled 
with the insurance company.  The settlement agreement 
is not the embodiment of claims filed by the underlying 
claimants . . . . Payment was not related to the 
individual claims which had been filed.  As a result, 
we find that in light of the fact that T & N had 
entered into a single settlement agreement with [its 
insurer] which encompassed all of its claims against 
the insurance company, it only has one covered claim 
which is subject to the $300,000 statutory limit. 
Id. at 184 (emphasis added).  We did not discredit Union 
Carbide's reasoning in any way.  To the contrary, this court's 
language in T & N indicates that, had T & N entered into a 
settlement agreement with the underlying claimants rather than 
the insurance company, we would have followed Union Carbide's 
lead.   
 The facts in this case are very similar to those in Union 
Carbide.  Porter has entered into settlement agreements with 
underlying claimants, and those settlements "can thus be viewed 
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as the embodiment of each claim which was filed," id., against 
Porter. 
B. 
 Our construction of the statute is supported by cases from 
other jurisdictions as well.  These cases all grow out of 
insurance disputes involving state Guaranty Agencies and statutes 
that are based on the model bill, and their reasoning is very 
much applicable to the instant case.  See, e.g., Plymouth Rubber 
Co. v. Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund, No. 87-440, slip 
op. (Mass. Super. Ct. May 24, 1988);  Commercial Union Insurance 
Company v. Sepco Corp. 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18378 (S.D. Alab. 
1989), aff'd, 918 F.2d 920 (11th Cir. 1990); Oglesby v. Liberty 
Mutual Insurance Company, 832 P.2d 834 (Okla. 1992). 
 For example, in Plymouth Rubber Co., the Massachusetts 
Superior Court held that each underlying claim raised against 
Plymouth Rubber Company, for which Plymouth Rubber sought 
indemnification from Massachusetts's Guaranty Fund, was a covered 
claim separately subject to the statutory $300,000 limit. 
Plymouth Rubber Co., No. 87-440, slip op. at 5.  The court 
explained as follows: 
Under the Ideal Mutual insurance policy . . . the 
covered claims which arose out of the policy were the 
obligations to "indemnify the insured for all sums 
which the insured shall become legally liable to pay as 
damages arising out of claims made" against the insured 
in excess of the policy's $250,000.00 aggregate annual 
deductible.  According to this language in the policy, 
Ideal Mutual was obligated to indemnify the plaintiff 
for all customer claims. . . . As such, every demand 
for indemnification was a covered claim. 
19 
Id.  The language of the insuring obligations in the policies 
issued by Integrity to Porter is substantially similar to the 
above quoted language in Plymouth Rubber's policy: 
. . . [Integrity Insurance] Company hereby agrees . . . 
to pay all sums, as more fully defined by the term 
ultimate net loss, for which the insured shall become 
obligated to pay by reason of liability  
(a) imposed upon the insured by law or 
(b) assumed under contract or agreement by 
the insured 
arising out of personal injury, property damage or 
advertising liability caused by an occurrence. 
App. at 29.  Therefore, the reasoning of Plymouth Rubber applies 
in the instant case as well. 
 Guidance in this area is also offered by Sepco Corp.  There 
the district court analyzed the purpose of the Alabama Insurance 
Guaranty Association Act, which is substantially the same as 
Pennsylvania's Act, and it concluded that the Alabama Insurance 
Guaranty Association (AIGA) was responsible for paying each of 
the underlying 2,000 claims made against Sepco by persons 
claiming bodily injury from exposure to Sepco's asbestos-
containing products: 
AIGA argues there is one aggregate claim, limiting 
AIGA's liability to $149,900.00.  This argument is 
without merit.  Each of the over 2,000 underlying cases 
produces a separate claim.  To accept this specious 
argument would defeat the intent of the liability 
policy which [the insolvent insurer] issued Sepco and 
would leave Sepco substantially without insurance for 
the year's time during which [the insolvent insurer] 
supposedly covered its liability. . . . This 
interpretation would defeat the intent of the Alabama 
Legislature when it enacted "The Act" to protect the 
public against insolvency of insurance carriers. 
Sepco Corp., 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18378 at *13 (footnote 
omitted) (emphasis added).  When the Eleventh Circuit reviewed 
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and affirmed this case on appeal, it declined to even address 
this specific claim by AIGA, noting it was "without merit and 
warrant[s] no discussion."  Sepco Corp., 918 F.2d at 923 n.3.   
 Finally, Porter's position is supported by the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court's decision in Oglesby v. Liberty Mutual.  There, 
the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the wife and two minor 
children of a man killed in an industrial accident each presented 
their own separate covered claim for which they were entitled to 
Oklahoma's $150,000 statutory cap of recovery from the Oklahoma 
Guaranty Association.  The Court noted that the portion of 
Oklahoma's statute in which the obligations of the Oklahoma 
Guaranty Association are laid out requires that "such obligations 
shall include the amount of each covered claim which is less than 
One Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($150,000.00) . . . ."  36 
Okla. Stat. § 2007 (emphasis added).  The Court explained, "[t]he 
Legislature's use of the word 'each' rather than 'all' covered 
claims indicates that it anticipated the possibility of multiple 
recoveries."  Oglesby, 832 P.2d at 840.  The same logic applies 
in the context of Pennsylvania where the statute explains that 
PIGA's "obligation shall include only that amount of each covered 
claim which is in excess of one hundred dollars ($100), and is 
less than three hundred thousand dollars ($300,000)."  40 P.S. 
§1701.201(b)(1)(i) (emphasis added).         
 We find that the rationale applied by these other courts is 
equally applicable to the facts of the instant case.  We find it 
all the more persuasive and compelling because PIGA has not 
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pointed to any case in any other court, nor have we found any, in 
which this issue was decided differently.   
 
 
IV. 
 We now briefly address PIGA's argument that Porter is only 
entitled to recover $299,900 for each of its three Integrity 
policies because the policies cover liability per "occurrence," 
and injuries caused by the ongoing manufacture and sale of 
asbestos are all deemed to be part of the same "occurrence."   
 PIGA asserts that when two Pennsylvania superior court 
cases, Vickodil v. Pennsylvania Insurance Guaranty Ass'n, 514 
A.2d 635 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986), allocatur denied, 523 A.2d 346 
(1987), and Donegal Mutual Insurance Co. v. Long, 564 A.2d 937 
(1989), aff'd, 597 A.2d 1124 (1991), are read together a rule 
emerges requiring that in instances where an insurance policy has 
a "per occurrence" limit but has no "per person" limit, the 
statutory limit of $299,900 applies to and substitutes for the 
occurrence limit, thus entitling the insured to only one covered 
claim under the policy.  We have reviewed both of these cases at 
length and conclude there is no merit to PIGA's argument 
whatsoever. 
 Furthermore, there is no support in the language of the Act 
itself that suggests that it is appropriate for PIGA to consider 
a "covered claim" to be all claims arising out of one occurrence. 
The language of the statute provides that PIGA's "obligation 
shall include only that amount of each covered claim" up to the 
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statutory limit.  40 P.S. § 1701.201(b)(1)(i).  The legislature 
used the phrase "each covered claim," not "each occurrence." This 
plain language in and of itself indicates that PIGA is obligated 
to pay up to the statutory cap on a per claim basis, not a per 
occurrence basis.  See, e.g., Ramage v. Alabama Insurance 
Guaranty Association, 919 F.2d 1010, 1012 (5th Cir. 1990) 
(holding that "the statutory language places a limit on the 
liability amount for a claim . . . but does not limit the number 
of claims which can be asserted from a particular occurrence"); 
Union Carbide, 585 A.2d at 1222 (holding that in context of 
Connecticut statute "[t]here is no basis for substituting the 
word 'occurrence' for the word 'claim'"); Florida Insurance 
Guaranty Association  v. Cole, 573 So.2d 868, 870 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1990) (holding that each injured person is entitled to file 
a claim regardless of whether injuries arose from the same 
occurrence); Trans Louisiana Gas Company v. Louisiana Insurance 
Guaranty Association, 652 So.2d 686, 691 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 
1995) (holding that the claims of two injured children arising 
from one occurrence constituted two covered claims for which LIGA 
was responsible to the statutory limit).   
V. 
 One might well argue that the Pennsylvania legislature never 
intended to compensate claims of this magnitude.  Mass tort 
claims may not have been considered or contemplated.  However, 
the statute makes clear that individual claims are subject to the 
statutory limitations and those limitations are not further 
23 
limited when asserted by the insured seeking indemnification for 
claims paid to or pending by others entitled to assert them.   
 Our interpretation carries out the legislative policy of 
protecting the insured and other claimants when an insurance 
carrier becomes insolvent and is unable to honor its commitments. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we hereby reverse the order of 
the district court granting partial summary judgment in favor of 
PIGA. 
